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A new method (‘explosive immunization’ (EI)) is proposed for immunization and targeted destruc-
tion of networks. It combines the explosive percolation (EP) paradigm with the idea of maintaining
a fragmented distribution of clusters. The ability of each node to block the spread of an infection
(or to prevent the existence of a large cluster of connected nodes) is estimated by a score. The
algorithm proceeds by first identifying low score nodes that should not be vaccinated/destroyed,
analogously to the links selected in EP if they do not lead to large clusters. As in EP, this is done by
selecting the worst node (weakest blocker) from a finite set of randomly chosen ‘candidates’. Tests
on several real-world and model networks suggest that the method is more efficient and faster than
any existing immunization strategy. Due to the latter property it can deal with very large networks.
Network robustness is a major theme in complex-
systems theory that has attracted much attention in re-
cent years [1]. Two specific problems are immunization
of networks against epidemic spreading (of infection dis-
eases, computer viruses, or malicious rumors), and the
destruction of networks by targeted attacks. At first sight
these two look completely different, but they can actu-
ally be mapped onto each other. The key observation is
that infection spreading in a population use the network
of contacts between hosts for their spread. Accordingly,
from the viewpoint of the infection, immunization corre-
sponds to an attack that destroys the network on which
it can spread. Vaccination of hosts (network nodes) is
often the most effective way to prevent large epidemics.
Other strategies include manipulating the network topol-
ogy [2–4] or introducing heterogeneity in transmission of
the infection [5–7].
The main task in both cases is to find those nodes
(“blockers”) whose removal is most efficient in destroy-
ing connectivity. Important blockers (“superblockers”)
are often assumed [8] to be equivalent to “superspread-
ers”, i.e. the most efficient nodes in spreading informa-
tion, supplies, marketing strategies, or technological in-
novations. Identifying superspreaders is the subject of a
vast literature [1] but, as pointed out in, e.g., Ref. [9],
identifying superblockers is not the same as finding su-
perspreaders. Indeed, a node in a densely connected core
will in general be a good spreader [10], but it will be in
general a very poor blocker, since the infection can easily
find ways to go around it.
Here we devise a strategy which identifies superblock-
ers. Vaccinating such nodes provides an efficient way to
fragment the network and reduce the possibility of large
epidemic outbreaks. We focus on “static” immunization
which aims at fragmenting the network before a possi-
ble outbreak occurs (“dynamical” immunization strate-
gies where one tries to contain an ongoing epidemic were
studied, for instance, in [11]). In our approach, the net-
work consists of N nodes out of which qN are vaccinated;
the rest are left susceptible to the infection. The size of
an invasion will depend on the fraction q of vaccinated
nodes, the type of epidemic (e.g. Susceptible-Infected-
Removed or Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible [12]), and
its virulence. However, the maximum fraction of nodes
infected at any time will always be bounded by the rela-
tive size S(q) of the largest cluster of susceptible nodes,
G(q). Keeping S(q) as small as possible will therefore en-
sure that epidemic outbreaks of any type are as small as
they can be for a vaccination level q [8, 13]. For large net-
works, N → ∞, the aim of immunization is to fragment
them so that S(q) = 0 [8]. The immunization threshold
qc is defined as the smallest q-value at which S(q) = 0.
Although qc is not well defined for finite N , it can be es-
timated reliably. Our algorithm deteriorates only when
the network is too small (in this case, however, an ex-
tensive search of the optimal solution can be performed).
In general, the smaller qc, the more effective is the corre-
sponding strategy, since the epidemic can be prevented
by vaccinating a smaller set of nodes.
The identification of superspreaders is in general an
NP-complete problem [14], and most likely this is also
true for finding superblockers. Therefore, heuristic ap-
proaches have to be used. Typically a score is assigned
to each node using local [15, 16] or global [8, 13, 17]
properties. In contrast to most previous papers, we use
an “inverse” [13] strategy. We start from a configuration
where all nodes are considered as potentially “danger-
ous” and are thereby virtually vaccinated (q = 1); then,
increasingly dangerous nodes are progressively “unvac-
cinated” (i.e. made susceptible). This is directly re-
lated to the concept of explosive percolation (EP) pro-
posed by Achlioptas et al. [18], [19]. EP has been dis-
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2cussed in a large number of papers because of its very
unusual threshold behavior [20]. It is reminiscent of a
wide range of “explosive” (i.e. strongly discontinuous)
phenomena in natural processes like social contagion [21],
generalized epidemics [22–24], k-core percolation [25], in-
terdependent networks [26, 27], synchronization [28–31]
or jamming [32] but so far no application of EP had been
proposed. To our knowledge, immunization is the first
context where EP is practically used.
Two other ingredients are also essential to make our
method fast and efficient: (i) We use two different
schemes for q > qc and q < qc, which both combine
local and quasi-global information; (ii) We use the fast
Newman-Ziff algorithm [33] to identify clusters of sus-
ceptible nodes. In addition, we use a number of heuristic
tricks that will be described below.
In the following we test the performance of EI for
both real-world and model networks. Overall, it gives
the smallest values of S(q) (although other strategies my
locally perform better for specific q-values). Moreover, it
gave in all cases by far the lowest values of qc compared
to all other strategies, except for the very recent message
passing algorithms of [34, 35]. Following the mainstream
in network studies, we focused on S(q), which corre-
sponds to outbreaks starting in G(q). However, outbreaks
can also start in any other cluster. An improved success
measure S¯(q) can be indirectly defined from the average
number of infected sites 〈ninf 〉 = N
∑
i S
2
i (q) ≡ NS¯2(q),
where Si(q) denote the sizes of all clusters, ordered from
the largest to the smallest one (S1(q) ≡ S(q)). If this is
used, our algorithm turns out to be yet more efficient,
and is optimal even when S(q) might suggest that it is
not (see Appendix A). In addition, our algorithm is also
extremely fast: Its time complexity is linear in N up to
logarithms.
The method: We adopt a recursive strategy. Given a
configuration with a mixture of vaccinated and suscepti-
ble nodes, m candidates are randomly chosen among the
vaccinated ones and the least dangerous (i.e. the weakest
blocker) is unvaccinated (we use typically m ∼ 103 [36]).
The selection process is based on a node score quantifying
its blocking ability. The guiding intuition is that harm-
less nodes should be identified on the basis of the size of
the cluster of susceptible nodes they would join if unvac-
cinated (these clusters should be kept small) and the lo-
cal effective connectivity which measures their potential
danger if made susceptible. As the relative importance of
these two ingredients is significantly different below and
above the immunization threshold, we use two different
scores. The details of both definitions were obtained by
a mix of heuristic arguments and trial-and-error. They
should not be considered as essential, and indeed very
similar results were obtained by different ansa¨tze within
the same spirit, see Appendices B and C.
The first score, used in the large-q region, is the sum
a
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FIG. 1. Illustration of the effective degree k
(eff)
i of a generic
vaccinated node i. Shaded areas identify distinct clusters of
susceptible nodes. With reference to Eq. (2), ki = 5 (see the
five neighbors of i labelled a−e); only node a is a leaf, so that
Li = 1. Assuming that the cutoff K is set equal to 6, none of
the nodes a − d is a hub, while node e is a hub provided no
more than one of its neighbours is a hub itself.
of two separate contributions,
σ
(1)
i = k
(eff)
i +
∑
C⊂Ni
(
√
|C| − 1) . (1)
The first term k
(eff)
i quantifies the potential danger due
to the effective local connectivity. It is determined self-
consistently from the bare degree ki,
k
(eff)
i = ki − Li −Mi({k(eff)j }) . (2)
The number Li of leaves is subtracted since they do not
lead anywhere. The number Mi of strong hubs is sub-
tracted since, in our inverse strategy, they will likely be
vaccinated in case of an epidemic. The analysis of several
networks has led us to identify strong hubs in a recursive
way as those nodes with k
(eff)
i ≥ K for a suitably chosen
cutoff K. We will see that the best results are typi-
cally obtained with K ≈ 6 for many networks, including
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) networks within a wide range of 〈k〉
(see Appendix D). An example of how k
(eff)
i is deter-
mined is given in Fig. 1, where all of the above details
are shown at work. Notice that, according to Eq. (2),
nodes surrounded by hubs may play a minor blocking role
for spread and can be left unvaccinated, as compared to
nodes without hub neighbors. This idea is similar to the
score used in [15], but it is opposite of what is assumed
e.g. in page rank [1] and in the collective influence” de-
fined in [8].
The second term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (1) is a q-
dependent contribution which takes into account the con-
nectivity of the network beyond the neighbours of node
i. It is based on the size of the clusters that would be
joined by turning the i-th node susceptible: Ni is the set
of all clusters linked to the ith node, while |C| is the size
of cluster C. A question arises about the weight to give
to this contribution. In Ref. [13], where only the nonlocal
3term was considered, a proportionality to the number |C|
of nodes was assumed; here we find better results by as-
suming a square root dependence (see also Appendix B).
Additionally, our choice preserves a higher fragmenta-
tion, preventing relatively large clusters of susceptibles
to merge together. Finally, the nonlocal character of this
contribution is better represented by imposing that each
addendum is larger than zero only for clusters containing
strictly more than one node: this is the reason for sub-
tracting 1; numerical simulations confirm the validity of
this choice.
As we will see, using σ
(1)
i yields small values of qc.
However, it is not suitable to keep a small S(q) below qc.
This is due to the fact that below qc it leads to big jumps
in S(q) when two large clusters join (similar jumps were
seen in [13, 34, 35]). As a result of the merging process,
many nodes (at the interface between the two clusters)
suddenly become harmless without being treated as such.
Accordingly, we use a different score σ
(2)
i with an even
stronger opposition to cluster merging,
σ
(2)
i =

∞ if G(q) 6⊂ Ni,
|Ni| else, if arg mini |Ni| is unique,
|Ni|+ |C2| else.
(3)
Here |Ni| is the number of clusters in the neighborhood
of i, C2 is the second-largest cluster in Ni, and  is a
small positive number (its value is not important pro-
vided   1/N). Thus we select only candidates which
have the giant cluster in their neighborhood; among these
we pick the candidate with the smallest number of neigh-
boring clusters, and if this is not unique, we pick the
candidate for which the second-largest neighboring clus-
ter is the smallest (see also Appendix C). The q-value
where the performance of σ
(1)
i deteriorates depends on
the network type and its size. However, we expect the
effect to become more pronounced below a value q∗ where
S(q∗) ≈ 1/√N , i.e. when a giant cluster starts dominat-
ing.
Two remarks are in order about the efficiency of our
algorithm: (i) In [13] all vaccinated nodes were consid-
ered as candidates to become susceptible during the de-
immunization process. This makes the algorithm very
slow and prevents its use for large networks. In our tests
already m = 10 candidates gave very good results, and
using m = 1000 candidates led to no noticeable degrada-
tion (see Appendix E); (ii) When joining clusters, we
used the very fast Newman-Ziff percolation algorithm
[33] which has time complexity O(N) for networks with
bounded degrees. It also gives, at each moment, the size
of the largest cluster, whose determination would other-
wise need most of the CPU time. As a result, we could
analyze networks with 108 nodes within hours on normal
workstations.
Numerical results: As a first test we studied ER
FIG. 2. Relative size S(q) of the largest clusters against q,
for ER networks with N = 106 and 〈k〉 = 3.5. The dashed
curve with jumps is obtained, if EI is used with score σ(1) for
all q, 2000 candidates, and K = 6. The continuous curve is
obtained with σ(2) for q < q∗, where S(q∗) = 1/500. The
dotted line shows the result from [8]. The inset shows a log-
log plot of qc against 〈k〉 − 1. The straight line indicates the
power law qc ∼ (〈k〉− 1)2.6, while the dotted curve shows the
result for random immunization.
networks with average degree 〈k〉 = 3.5 (to compare with
results from [8]). Overall, the best results are obtained
by using the scores given in Eqs. (1) and (3) (Fig. 2,
solid line in main plot). The dashed line is obtained by
using σ
(1)
i for all q (the big jumps, which were also seen
in [13], correspond to joinings of big clusters). It is in
general worse than the continuous curve, except close to
the jumps (see, however, Appendices B and C). Finally
we show in Fig. 2 also the results obtained with the re-
cently proposed collective influence algorithm [8], which
was hailed in as “perfect” [37]. They are significantly
worse. Our estimate qc ≤ 0.1838(1) is also smaller than
the best estimate 0.192(9) obtained in [8] using extremal
optimization [38], and used there as “gold standard” for
small networks (it is too slow to be used for large net-
works).
As regards ER networks with other values of 〈k〉, we
first looked at 〈k〉 = 4, since this had been used in [13].
Our results are similar to those of [13], but significantly
better. Next we estimated qc for a wide range of 〈k〉. By
using networks with N up to 224 we were able to obtain
precise results even for 〈k〉 very close to the threshold
〈k〉 = 1 for the existence of a giant cluster. The results,
shown in the inset of Fig. 2, suggest that qc satisfies for
small 〈k〉 a power law
qc ∼ (〈k〉 − 1)2.6, (4)
where the error of the exponent is ≈ ±0.2. This should
be compared to random immunization [39], qrandc =
(〈k〉 − 1)/〈k〉 (dotted curve in the inset of Fig. 2). The
4difference in the exponents reflects the fact that a nearly
critical cluster can be destroyed by removing a few “hot”
nodes, whence targeted attacks become more efficient as
〈k〉 approaches the threshold.
Surprisingly, for all 〈k〉 values except very close to 1,
best results are obtained with K = 6. This suggests that
most nodes with k
(eff)
i > 6 are vaccinated at qc, inde-
pendently of the average degree. This was also verified
directly: Although there is no strict relationship between
effective degree and blocking power (some hubs were not
vaccinated at qc, while some nodes that were vaccinated
are not strong hubs), there is a very strong correlation,
stronger than between actual degree and blocking power
(see Appendix D). On the other hand, very few nodes
with small k
(eff)
i have to be vaccinated (about 1 per mille
of the nodes with k
(eff)
i = 3), in contrast to claims in [8]
that weakly connected nodes are often important block-
ers.
Scale-free networks. EI also gives excellent results for
scale-free (SF) networks with node degree distribution
pk ∼ k−γ , built with both the Baraba´si-Albert method
(fixed γ = 3) and the configuration model (γ can be
tuned) [1, 40]. Our results are significantly better than
those obtained with the method from [8] for both settings
(Fig. 3(a) and (b)). Using a single score across the entire
q-range gives again the best estimate for qc, while the
two-score strategy proves generally superior for q < qc.
The jumps obtained in the single-score strategy are less
pronounced for the configuration model (and thus the
two-score strategy seems less preferable), but the superi-
ority of the two-score strategy becomes again clear when
using the improved S¯(q) discussed in Appendix A.
Observe that the shape of S(q) near q = 0 is con-
cave/convex for large/small γ (compare panels (a) and
(b) in Fig. 3). The convex shape for small γ is due to the
presence of many hubs which lead to a drastic decrease
of S(q) when vaccinated at small q.
Real world networks: We have also studied the perfor-
mance of EI on a number of real-world networks, starting
from an example in which immunization plays an impor-
tant role for food security [41, 42]: a network of Scottish
cattle movements [43]. The network consists of N = 7228
premises (nodes) connected by E = 24784 transporta-
tion events (edges) occurring between 2005 and 2007.
The node distribution obeys a power-law with exponent
γ = 2.37 ± 0.06 (Maximum likelihood fit). The scenario
is similar to that of SF networks with small γ (compare
panels (c) and (b) in Fig. 3). Again, S(q) decreases quite
quickly because of the presence of many well connected
nodes (e.g. markets and slaughterhouses), whose immu-
nization leads to a drastic decrease of the largest cluster.
Once again we see that our strategy using two scores is
superior to the previous approaches.
We have also studied several networks that were used
as benchmark in previous works. This includes the high-
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FIG. 3. Relative size S(q) of the largest clusters in SF net-
works of size N = 106 obtained with (a) the Albert-Bara´basi
model (γ = 3) and (b) the configuration model with γ = 2.5.
Panels (c) and (d) show results for the cattle and airport
transportation networks, respectively. Different line types
correspond to different algorithms: EI using scores σ
(1)
i and
σ
(2)
i (continuous line) or only score σ
(1)
i (dashed line) and the
algorithm in [8] (dotted line).
energy physicist collaboration network [44] and the in-
ternet at autonomous system level [45]. In both cases
our results are similar to, but slightly better than, in [13]
(which were the best previous estimates). The results for
these and soil networks [46] are shown in Appendix F.
A particularly problematic case is the airline net-
work [47], also studied in [2]. This is a rather small
network (N = 3151 and E = 27158) with a broad de-
gree distribution (power-law with γ = 1.70± 0.04). The
results reported in Fig. 3(d) show that σ
(1)
i provides very
low S(q) almost everywhere. We conjecture this is due to
the unusually small γ, which implies an abundant num-
ber of hubs. As a result, the outcome of the score σ
(2)
i
strongly depends on the value of qc that is selected. It
is anyway clear that a suitable combination of them pro-
vides the optimal results.
Conclusions: In this paper, we extend the explosive
percolation concept to propose a two-score strategy for
attacking networks that proves superior to all previously
proposed protocols. The comparison between the two
scores suggests that an everywhere optimal strategy us-
ing a single score is unlikely to exist. This is to be traced
back to the NP completeness of the problem. Since im-
munization of a network by vaccinating nodes can be re-
garded as a strategy for destroying the network on which
an infection can propagate, this also gives a nearly opti-
mal strategy for immunization. Our explosive immuniza-
tion method seems superior, both as regards speed and
minimal cost (as measured by the number of vaccinated
nodes) to all previous strategies.
We have focused on immunization of nodes but EI can
5also be applied to immunization of links. This would
provide nearly optimal quarantine strategies which might
significantly improve the typical brute-force implementa-
tion which cut all the links between two parts of a net-
work. Targeted removal of links with high betweeness
centrality is the basis for one of the most efficient algo-
rithm for finding network communities [48]. We propose
that explosive immunization of links should also provide
a very efficient algorithms for community detection.
The authors acknowledge financial support from the
Leverhulme Trust (Grant No. VP2-2014-043) and from
Horizon2020 (Grant No. 642563 - COSMOS).
Appendix A: Improved success measure for network
immunization
The standard measure for the success of an immuniza-
tion strategy is the relative size of the largest connected
cluster, G(q), after a fraction q of nodes have been vacci-
nated,
S(q) = |G(q)|/N , (A1)
where |G(q)| is the size of the largest cluster. The mo-
tivation for this is that a strongly infective disease that
hits a random node will in average infect a region of size
NS(q)2 in the largest cluster, where the first factor of
S(q) is for the probability that the largest cluster is hit
at all, and the other factors give the number of infected
sites, if it does so. This quantity neglects the effect of
smaller clusters, following a widespread habit in network
science. Often this is justified because their contribution
is small and/or hard to estimate. But in the present case,
the contribution of clusters other than the largest one can
be substantial, and it can be taken into account easily.
In order to incorporate the effect of epidemics starting in
all clusters in our analysis, let us assume the clusters to
be ordered by size, |G(q)| ≡ |C1(q)| ≥ |C2(q)| ≥ . . .. The
probability that a random outbreak starts in a cluster
Ci is Si(q) = N−1|Ci| and its maximum size is NSi(q).
Accordingly, the average number of infected sites in an
random outbreak is
〈ninfected〉 = NS(q)2 +N
∑
i≥2
Si(q)
2 = NS¯(q)2, (A2)
where, perturbatively,
S¯(q) = S(q)
1 + 1
2
∑
i≥2
(
Si(q)
S(q)
)2
+ . . .
 (A3)
For EI with both scores there will never be more than
one large cluster (at least for large networks with a well
defined qc), since there is no large cluster for q > q
∗,
and for q < q∗ the growth of a second large cluster is
suppressed. In this case S¯(q) is practically the same as
0.0
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 0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2
S (
q )  
,    
  S-
( q )
q
S(q) two scores
S- (q) single score
S(q) single score
FIG. 4. Success measures S(q) (lower (black) steplike curve)
and S¯(q) (upper (red) steplike curve) for ER networks with
〈k〉 = 3.5, if score σ(1) is used for all q. The smooth curve
corresponds to the case where σ(2) is used for q < qc. In that
case, the curves for S(q) and S¯(q) are indistinguishable except
in a small region q > qc.
S(q), as we indeed checked for ER networks. This is not
true, however, for q < q∗ if the score σ(1) is used also
there. In that case there are in general more than one
large cluster, and S¯(q) is considerably larger than S(q),
see Fig. 4.
Thus even when it seems better to use σ(1) for all q
(according to the success measure S(q)), a more refined
success measure might show that the strategy of using
both scores σ(1) and σ(2) is superior.
Appendix B: Motivation for score σ(1)
In [18], two scores were considered for EP: the ‘sum
rule’ where the score is equal to the sum of the masses
of the two joined clusters (remember that in EP links
are added, not nodes), and the ’product rule’, where the
score is their product. Alternatively, we could implement
the product rule as the sum of the logarithms of the clus-
ter masses. In EI we would just replace the two clusters
by the set of all clusters joined by adding the chosen can-
didate node. When testing these on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER)
networks with 〈k〉 = 1.75, both gave results for qc that
were about ≈ 5 to 10% worse that our best result shown
in Fig. 2 of the main text, but comparable with the result
of [8].
To improve on this, we considered the following heuris-
tics:
• While the sum rule puts too much weight on very
large clusters that are joined, the product rule does
not put enough weight on them. As a compromise,
we added the square roots of the masses, which im-
6proved already slightly the estimate of qc (compare
the continuous and dotted lines in Fig. 5).
• Neither of the three above rules pays enough atten-
tion to the degree of the chosen node i. Thus we
added a term ∝ ki. When trying different relative
weights, we obtained best results with the weights
given in Eq. (1) of the main text. The improvement
was again small (1-2%), but significant.
• When calculating the degree of the chosen node
i, neighboring leaves should be dismissed as they
would not help any epidemic spreading. This was
verified, and again the effect was small.
• If one of the neighbors is a very strong hub, it will
finally presumably be vaccinated, in which case it
cannot contribute to epidemic spreading. It, there-
forei, should not be included in the effective neigh-
bor count and, maybe, it should not be included in
the sum over the neighboring cluster masses (the
second term in Eq. (1) of the main text) either. We
found (again for ER networks with 〈k〉 = 3.5) that
the second option had practically no effect (it was
neither beneficial nor detrimental), but excluding
such hubs from the effective degree gave a signifi-
cant improvement, provided the hubs were properly
identified (compare the continuous and dashed line
in Fig. 5). The latter included that we define the
effective node degree recursively, and the recursion
converged only then in all cases, if it was done with
forward substitution. The effect of the cut-off K to
define hubs is illustrated in the inset of Fig. 5.
• In [13], where a strategy very similar to ours was
proposed, the scores were computed by dismiss-
ing all nodes from the network that were already
judged as harmless. We found this to be detrimen-
tal in most cases, whence we did not use it.
Appendix C: Motivation for score σ(2)
The main motivation for not using σ(1) for q < qc, i.e.
when there exists already a macroscopic giant cluster of
non-vaccinated nodes, is the occurrence of big jumps in
S(q). They occur when two large clusters finally have
to join. The same jumps were seen also in [13] and in
[34, 35]. While S(q) is very small for q immediately be-
fore the jump, it is much larger than in an optimal strat-
egy after the jump. In general, thus, score σ(1) gives
optimal results for some regions of q, but these regions
are very small and outweighed by the much larger regions
where it is definitely suboptimal. This conclusion is even
strengthened when using the more realistic S¯ as a success
criterion.
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FIG. 5. Comparison of several different choices for score σ(1).
The main panel shows the relative size S(q) of the largest
clusters against q for ER networks withN = 105 and 〈k〉 = 3.5
using m = 2000 candidates. The continuous black line shows
σ(1) with K = 6. The red dotted line is a modified version
of Eq.(1) in the main text without the square root. The blue
dashed line shows the effect of removing the contribution k(eff)
in σ(1). The inset shows the effect on S(q) of using Eq. (1)
with different values of the hub cut-off K in the same graph as
in the main panel (K = 6, 8, 10 for black continuous, magenta
dashed and brown dotted lines, respectively).
Otherwise said, after two large clusters have joined and
the relative size of the largest cluster is S, the fraction
q of nodes not yet declared as harmless is much larger
(when using σ(1)) than necessary. This is fairly easy to
understand. As long as the two clusters are still disjoint,
all nodes in the interface between them are ‘dangerous’
in the sense that infecting any of them would give rise
to a large increase of infected area. But after the two
clusters have joined, all these nodes are harmless, even
if they are not yet declared as such. At the same time,
these nodes will in general not be connected with each
other, and when vaccinating them we would effectively
influence a single node – which is of course extremely
inefficient.
Thus the guiding principle for q < qc should be that
we want to avoid as much as possible the formation of
isolated, not yet vaccinated, nodes. Only as a secondary
criterion we want to avoid the formation of large clusters.
Equation (3) of the main text does exactly that.
We should add that score σ(2) has a very similar effect
as the procedure used by Morone et al. [8] in their ‘sec-
ond pass’. Remember that Morone et al. first used the
‘collective influence’ in a forward strategy, where they
identified nodes to be vaccinated. They stopped this for-
ward iteration when q ≈ qc, and then added a second pass
(explained only in their supplementary material) where
they ‘de-vaccinated’ some nodes. It was indeed largely
this second step which made their algorithm successful,
but they gave no argument for the specific algorithm used
for the de-vaccination.
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FIG. 6. (a) Log-linear plot of P (k(eff)) for ER networks with
〈k〉 = 3.5. The left histogram is for all nodes, the right one is
for those nodes that are not declared as “harmless” at q = qc
and which therefore must be vaccinated in order to immunize
the network. Panel (b) shows the analogous distributions for
the actual degrees. Notice that for the vaccinated nodes, the
distribution of k(eff) has a slightly sharper cut-off than that
of k, indicating that k(eff) is a better indicator for nodes that
must be vaccinated than k. The same was found also for all
other values of 〈k〉.
Appendix D: Degree distributions of vaccinated
nodes at q = qc
Naively, one expects that it is the strongest hubs that
should be vaccinated first, but the fact that network im-
munization is non-trivial shows that this is not exactly
true. If the motivation that led us to define the effective
degree k(eff) is correct, we should expect the vaccinated
nodes to be more strongly concentrated in the high-k(eff)
region, than they are concentrated in the high-k region.
Here we show data that indeed confirm this, although the
difference is rather small. More precisely, we show in the
left panel of Fig. 6 two histograms: The k(eff)-distribution
of all nodes in an ER network with 〈k〉 = 3.5 and the dis-
tribution of those nodes that are vaccinated at q = qc.
In the right panel the corresponding two k-distributions
are shown.
We see that in both cases nearly all nodes with degree
> 7 are vaccinated, while nearly all nodes with degree
< 4 are left unvaccinated. This agrees with our findings
that K = 6 is optimal in this case. A closer look shows
that the k(eff)-distribution of vaccinated nodes has indeed
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FIG. 7. Dependence of S(q) on the number of candidates m
for an ER graph with 〈k〉 = 3.5 and N = 105. Results in (a)
were obtained using score σ(1) for all q; those in panel (b) were
obtained using score σ(1) for q > q∗ and σ(2) for q < q∗, where
q∗ was defined as the point where S(q) = 1/
√
N . Different
line types correspond to different values of m, as marked by
the legend. The inset shows a magnified view of the region
around qc. All the curves have been obtained using score σ
(1)
for all values of q.
a slightly sharper cut off than the k-distribution. For
instance, while ≈ 25 % of nodes with k = 6 are not
vaccinated, this is true for only ≈ 10 % of nodes with
k(eff) = 6.
Appendix E: Dependence on the number of
candidates, m
The number m of vaccinated nodes considered to be-
come susceptible at each step of the de-immunization
procedure is a tunable parameter of our model. Fig. 7
shows the effect of m on the size of the largest cluster,
S(q). As can be seen, irrespective of the strategy used
to choose the score as a function of q, the results be-
come insensitive to the number of candidates already for
m = 1000. The running time increases fast with m (see
Fig. 8). Therefore, using m ' 1000 represents an im-
portant improvement to the running time compared to
Ref. [13] which used m = N .
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FIG. 8. Dependence of the running time of the algorithm on
the number of candidates m for an ER graph with 〈k〉 = 3.5
and N = 106.
Appendix F: Real-world networks
We present the detailed results for three other real-
world networks. In each of them we compare the two
different scores of Explosive Immunization (EI) with the
Collective Influence (CI) method proposed by Morone
et. al. [8]. We also show an example of how the hub
cut-off parameter K in the computation of the effective
degree k
(eff)
i modifies the results. In all three plots
we use only the success measure S(q) (for more easy
comparison with previous literature), but we should
keep in mind that methods producing large steps would
become worse when using S¯(q).
Soil network: We study a network of the structure
of soil pores with N = 49709 nodes and E = 69563
links presented in [46]. This network has a large clus-
tering coefficient and a limited degree distribution with
〈k〉 = 2.8. In figure 9(a) we plot the results of EI and CI
using K = 8 and S(q∗) = 0.06. In this case, EI produces
better results than CI everywhere. In particular, using
the score σ
(1)
i for all q is optimal except when q is very
small (see, however, the above caveat about using S¯(q)
instead of S(q)). In the inset panel we show differ-
ent values of K effect the outcome of σ
(1)
i in this network.
Internet: In figure 9b we show the results for a
network representing the Internet at the level of au-
tonomous system[? ] with N = 25612 and E = 82053.
We set the parameters K = 6 and S(q∗) = 0.02. In this
case, different values of K do not change significantly
the outcome. In general we observe a behavior similar
to the cattle network in which an early vaccination of
nodes produces a strong decrease of S(q). Again the EI
method gives better results than CI.
High-Energy Physicists: Finally, in figure 9c we
use the high-energy physicist collaboration network[? ]
also used in [13] consisting of N = 27240 nodes and
E = 341923 links. We plot the results using K = 6
and S(q∗) = 0.01. The proposed EI algorithm achieves
a better value of qc than the one obtained by Schneider
et. al.. Both are better than the one obtained with CI.
When the giant component is grown for small q (signifi-
cantly < qc), the CI method is similar but slightly better
than EI. This is the only case that we have found where
EI is not optimal everywhere.
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